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INTRODUCTION

Equal protection guarantees are arguably the most important
constitutional guarantees of individual rights.' They balance
governmental interests against two important individual rights:
the right to be free from unnecessary governmental interference
in the exercise of fundamental rights, and the right to be free
from governmental discrimination against insular and politically
powerless groups.
One hundred and seventy-five years ago, the United States
Supreme Court laid the foundation for equal protection review
of legislation. 2 Courts have applied the highly deferential rational basis standard that developed from that early foundation
under the equal protection provisions of both the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions. Under both provisions, however,
federal and state courts have found it necessary to adopt heightened standards of review in certain situations.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of equal protection
jurisprudence. Part II focuses on the efforts of federal courts to
establish an equal protection standard that fairly balances the
interests of the government and the interests of individuals. Part
III discusses a similar effort by Minnesota courts to establish a
fair standard under the state constitution. This commentary examines the comparison engendered by Minnesota's two rational
basis standards and discusses points of departure from the federal heightened scrutiny standards. Part IV proposes and designs a multi-factor approach that would address the apparent
1. SeeJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrruTrIONAL LAw 568 (4th ed.
1991). Nowak and Rotunda comment:
In recent years the equal protection guarantee has become the single most
important concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual rights.
As we have seen, substantive due process analysis was disclaimed after 1937
and the justices today are not willing to restrict the legislative ability to deal
with a subject under that analysis. And the privileges or immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment has never been a meaningful vehicle for the judicial review of state actions, although it may have been intended to be a primary safeguard of natural law rights by the drafters of the amendment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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concerns of the judiciary and provide clear guidance to state
lawmakers. Part V concludes that, after a century-long effort to
construct a just system based on rigid categories, Minnesota
courts should abandon that attempt and adopt the multi-factor
approach.
II.

OVERVIEW

Both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution' and article 1, section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution 4
provide individuals with equal protection guarantees from state
and local governmental regulation.5
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id. § 1.
4. MINN. CONST. art. I. Section 2 of article I provides: "No member of this State
shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers." Id. § 2.
Although the Minnesota Constitution does not have an equal protection clause per
se, article 1, § 2 is most frequently cited as the source of state equal protection rights.
See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1991) (citing article I, § 2 of the
Minnesota Constitution). The language of this provision is significantly different from
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, facially
providing guarantees more along the lines of due process protection. Assuming Minnesota article I is a due process provision, however, rights to equal protection arguably
may be implied in a manner similar to the implication of equal protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See infra
note 5.
On the other hand, a number of Minnesota cases have found the source of equal
protection in other provisions of the Minnesota Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Pehrson,
205 Minn. 573, 577, 287 N.W. 313, 315 (1939) (relying on article IV, § 33 as well as on
article I, § 2); Franke v. Allen, 199 Minn. 450, 272 N.W. 165 (1937) (rejecting defendant's argument that the statute violated his equal protection rights found in article IV,
§§ 33-34).
At one time, article IV, § 33 provided: "In all cases when a general law can be made
applicable, no special law shall be enacted. . ... " MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 33
(1881). This provision became article XII, § 1 of the Minnesota Constitution when it
was amended and restructured in 1974. See MINN. CONSr. art. XII, § 1. Justice Tomljanovich attempted to clarify this issue in her dissenting opinion in Mitchell v. Steffen,
504 N.W.2d 198 (1993). "Our equal protection 'clause' is an un-enumerated but inherent constitutional right, found and confirmed in Minn. Const. art. I, § 16 and included
in art. I, § 2. Under this equality guaranty, 'persons similarly situated are to be treated
alike unless a sufficient basis exists for distinguishing among them.' " Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
5. The Fifth Amendment, which applies to acts of the federal government, does
not have an equal protection provision, per se. The Fifth Amendment provides that
"[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONS-r. amend. V. This Due Process Clause has been construed to provide
equal protection guarantees. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (rec-
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To determine whether or not state action violates equal protection, federal and state courts traditionally have balanced the
interests of the individual against those of the governmental entity that seeks to regulate the individual's activities.6 This balancing approach has focused on two separate factors: the purpose
or ends sought by the government and the means chosen by the
government to achieve the ends. 7 The ends analysis requires
courts to consider the nature and importance of the state's
ends.8 Under the means analysis, courts consider the closeness
of the relationship between the state's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.9
ognizing that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process").
Nowak and Rotunda explain:
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by its own terms
applies only to state and local governments. There is no equal protection
clause that governs the actions of the federal government, and the Court has
not attempted to make the clause itself applicable to federal acts. However, if
the federal government classifies individuals in a way which would violate the
equal protection clause, it will be held to contravene the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 568-69.
6. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a
showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling .... "
Id. at 497 (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)); see also Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (balancing the individual's interest in not
divulging his association with the Communist Party against the government's interest in
investigating Communist activities); Bolin v. State, 313 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn. 1981)
(balancing the state's interest in promoting harmony between the state highway patrol
and the sheriff's office against the individual trooper's interest in running for political
office).
7. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (finding appropriate,
as a means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, the section of the Voting Rights
Act providing that those who complete the sixth grade in an American school cannot
be required to take a literacy test); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 (considering
whether the state's goal of targeting street level drug dealers was met by a statute that
provided more severe penalties for those possessing crack as opposed to powder
cocaine).
8. See, e.g., Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 654 (finding that the Voting Rights Act was
enacted by Congress to eliminate "invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications" and thus enforce the Equal Protection Clause).
9. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (finding that
exclusion of individuals ofJapanese ancestry from "threatened areas" on the West coast
of the United States had a "definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage").

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/5

4

1994]

Iijima: Minnesota Equal EQUAL
Protection
in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulat
PROTECTION

Under both federal and state equal protection guarantees,
courts scrutinize to varying degrees the legitimacy of the government's ends and the relationship of the regulation to those ends.
The standard that courts apply has depended on a number of
factors, including: (1) the nature of the government's interests; 10
(2) the nature of the individual interest burdened;1 1 and (3) the
identity of the class burdened.1 2 The degree of a court's deference in reviewing challenged legislation also is influenced by
whether the challenge is based on the federal or a state
13
constitution.
The degrees of scrutiny a court will apply include the rational
basis standard and varying degrees of heightened scrutiny, such
as the intermediate standard and the strict scrutiny standard. 4
Courts apply these standards with considerable flexibility. For
example, under the Minnesota equal protection clause, there apparently are two different rational basis standards, one of which
is significantly less deferential than the other. 5 Similarly, under
the Federal Equal Protection Clause, the United States Supreme
Court has occasionally applied the rational basis standard in a
less deferential manner than it usually does.' 6
III.

"OLD FORMULATIONS"-FEDERAL

EQUAL

PROTECTION

In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for subsequent ends/means analyses when he delineated the constitu10. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18 (considering the interest of the military,
which was "charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores," in excluding individuals of Japanese descent from areas of the West coast).
11. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31-39 (1973)
(finding education is not a right that is subject to strict scrutiny).
12. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (holding that "[c]lassifying
persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate
public concerns"); see also infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 54-72, 101-04 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). In Clark, the Court recognized
that:
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based
on race or national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights are
given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis
review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally
has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.
Id. (citations omitted).
15. See infra part IV.A.1.
16. See infra part III.C.
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tional limits of the implied powers of Congress: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 7 Depending on
the nature of the interest at issue, federal courts have traditionally imposed one of two analytical models, either a rational basis
standard, or some form of heightened scrutiny.
A.

Rational Basis Standard

The United States Supreme Court has effectively adopted Justice Marshall's formulation as the general standard of review
under equal protection."8 Under this "rational basis standard"
courts apply a two-factor analysis to review general social welfare
or economic regulations.1 The state's ends need only be legitimate, and the means chosen need only be rationally related to
those ends.2" Under this extremely deferential standard, "legitimacy" is broadly defined-the issue is whether the ends are prohibited by the constitution.2" The rational relationship portion
of the standard is similarly broad-courts need inquire only
whether the classification conceivably bears a rational relation22
ship to the ends.

17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
18. "[W]hen the Court examines substantive due process or equal protection
claims, a majority of the justices will uphold the challenged governmental act unless no
reasonably conceivable set of facts could establish a rational relationship between the
challenged regulation and a legitimate end of government." NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 1, at 379.
19. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (applying
a "reasonable basis" analysis to a statute regulating the pumping of gas). During various
periods, particularly between 1865 and 1937, the Court applied this standard with less
deference to the legislature to invalidate a number of economic regulations. See NowAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 356-69, 574-75.
20. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 574-75.
21. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The Court in Katzenbach
described the analysis as requiring consideration of "whether [the Voting Rights Act]
may be regarded as an enactment to endorse the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is
'plainly adapted to that end' and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with
'the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution.' " Id. at 651 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
22. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see also
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 574-75.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/5

6

Iijima: Minnesota Equal EQUAL
ProtectionPROTECTION
in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulat

19941
B.

Heightened Scrutiny

The Supreme Court subsequently determined that, in certain
situations, the extremely deferential rational basis standard did
not sufficiently protect the interests of individuals from incursions by the state."3 Accordingly, the Court modified the ends/
means formulation to allow for higher levels of scrutiny of some
governmental regulations. 4 Under these newer formulations,
courts do not defer to the decision of the governmental body,
but independently determine whether the classification bears
the requisite relationship to a sufficiently important governmental end.
The Supreme Court applies heightened scrutiny in two types
of cases: (1) where the legislation discriminates against groups of
individuals based on certain "suspect" or "near-suspect" classifications; or (2) where the regulation intrudes upon individual
rights deemed to be "fundamental."2 5
1.

Use of Suspect Classifications

Legislation often imposes classifications on groups in order to
apply benefits and burdens without raising equal protection issues. Courts generally use the highly deferential rational basis
standard to determine the validity of the discriminatory classifi* 26
cation.
However, courts are unwilling to presume that the
state's ends are legitimate where the state's classifications are
23. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hnav. L. REv. 1 (1972). Gunther described this
transition as follows:
At the beginning of the 1960's [sic],judicial intervention under the banner
of equal protection was virtually unknown outside racial discrimination cases.
The emergence of the "new" equal protection during the Warren Court's last
decade brought a dramatic change. Strict scrutiny of selected types of legislation proliferated. The familiar signals of "suspect classification" and "fundamental interest" came to trigger the occasions for the new interventionist
stance. The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations
evoked the aggressive "new" equal protection, with scrutiny that was "strict" in
theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential "old" equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.
Id. at 8.
24. See infra parts III.B., III.C.
25. See infra part III.B.
26. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state statute
that capped family welfare benefits at $250 per month regardless of number of family
members). The Court has stated:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend
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"suspect."27 A suspect classification is found where the regulations disparately burden insular groups historically subjected to
28
discriminatory treatment.
a. Strict Scrutiny Standard
In 1944, the Supreme Court determined that deference to
governmental action would be inappropriate where disparate
treatment was based on race or national origin. 29 Rather, the
Court held that such governmental action would be subject to
"the most rigid scrutiny."3 0 Under this standard, the action must
the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)); see
also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426-28 (1961) (finding no equal protection
violation under Sunday closing laws).
27. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (reasoning that a classification
that disadvantages a suspect class is "presumptively invidious").
28. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In Carolene Products, the Court for the first time suggested the rationale for additional protection for
suspect classifications:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities,
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted).
29. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In Korematsu, an American citizen ofJapanese heritage refused to comply with Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, that required all
persons of Japanese ancestry to leave the West Coast of the United States, a so-called
"Military Area." Id. at 215-16. Although his loyalty was not questioned, the Court held
that Korematsu's conviction did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 223.
30. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. In Korematsu, the Court reasoned:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes
justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
Id. The Court went on to hold that the assertion of military necessity was a sufficient
justification for the racial classification. Id. at 223-24. Although the Korematsu decision
did not expressly establish the strict scrutiny standard, it did set the stage. Nowak and
Rotunda have observed:
This opinion thus established three points for future analysis of classifications based on race or national origin. First, these classifications were "suspect" which meant, at a minimum, that they were likely to be based on an
impermissible purpose. Second, these classifications were to be subject to independent judicial review-"rigid scrutiny." Third, such classifications would
be invalid if based on racial antagonism and upheld only if they were based on
"public necessity." From this opinion came the concepts of "strict judicial
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be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental purpose."1
In 1971, the Court applied this strict scrutiny standard to a state
32
law that classified individuals on the basis of alienage.
b. Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
In the 197 0s, faced with gender-based legislation, the Supreme
Court found it necessary to fashion a third standard of review
that fell between the rational basis and strict scrutiny standards." By 1976, the Supreme Court formulated an "intermediate scrutiny" standard under which the challenged regulation
had to be "substantially related" to an "important governmental
interest."3 4 The Court now applies this intermediate standard to
classifications based on the legitimacy of children, as well as to
gender-based classifications. 5
scrutiny" and the requirement that some restrictions on liberty must be necessary to promote "compelling" or "overriding" interests.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 623 (footnotes omitted).

31. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993) (holding that North Carolina's redistricting plan was an unconstitutional attempt to segregate people to improve their
voting power); see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
32. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (reasoning that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on ... race, are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny"). The Supreme Court is more deferential to federal legislation
based on alienage. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of a federal statute conditioning an alien's eligibility to participate in a
federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United States for a
five-year period and admission for permanent residence).
33. In 1972, Professor Gunther observed that the Burger Court demonstrated increasing dissatisfaction with the "rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's
equal protection doctrine," and its tendency to use the Equal Protection Clause for
independent review of governmental regulation without applying the strict scrutiny
standard. Gunther, supra note 23, at 12. Nowak and Rotunda further describe this
evolution:
It soon became clear that the Court would no longer treat sex-based classifications with the judicial deference given economic regulations; however, it became equally clear that such classifications are not subject to the "strict
scrutiny" given to truly suspect classifications such as those based upon race.
For a five-year period, the Court struggled with the appropriate standard or
[sic] review to be applied in gender-based discriminations.
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 734.

34. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court earlier had rejected
applying rational basis review to sex-based classifications, but had not fully articulated
the intermediate scrutiny standard. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)
(holding that the challenged regulation had to be "substantially related" to the object
of the legislation).
35. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute setting a six-year statute of limitations in paternity actions). In earlier
cases, the Court applied an intermediate scrutiny standard to classifications based upon
illegitimacy that was somewhat differently worded. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,
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Interference with FundamentalRights

The Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to legislative classifications that significantly burden the exercise of
rights deemed to be "fundamental." 6 Fundamental rights include the right to engage in: activities expressly protected by the
3 7
constitution, such as the exercise of First Amendment rights;
activities impliedly protected by the constitution such as interstate travel and marriage;3 8 and certain activities which do not
enjoy independent constitutional protection, but, like the general right to vote, are nevertheless considered fundamental.3 9
C.

Rational Basis Standard with Teeth

In the 1980s, the Supreme Court arguably created a fourth
standard for equal protection analysis when it applied the rational basis test in a less deferential manner than was typical.
This less deferential use of the rational basis standard has been
called "rational basis with teeth" or "with bite."4"
265 (1978) (stating that a New York illegitimacy statute must be "substantially related to
permissible state interests"); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (holding provisions of the Social Security Act constitutional because congressional assumptions were
not so "inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its
conclusions."
36. The Court sometimes applies the strict scrutiny standard, requiring the classification to be necessary to a compelling governmental interest. See NowAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, at 577. At other times, it performs an independent review of the legislation without expressly applying the strict scrutiny standard. Id.
37. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992) (holding that a
statute censoring expressive conduct violated the First Amendment); Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (protecting the "free flow of ideas and opinions");
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (finding that freedom of speech is a fundamental right).
38. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding that marriage is
a fundamental liberty under the Due Process Clause); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he right of
interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom");
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (holding that the right to travel is a
fundamental right); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that marriage is a fundamental freedom).
39. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (holding that the right to
vote is a fundamental right "preservative of all rights").
40. These orthodontic analogies have gained strong support among commentators. See, e.g., RenataJ. Baker et al., Survey: Developments in Maryland Law, 1991-92, 52
MD. L. REv. 530, 551 n.150 (1993) (citing cases in which the Court's standard of review
has been characterized as "rational basis with teeth"); Marco de Sa e Silva, Constitutional
Challenges to Washington's Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal Injuy and
Death, 63 WASH. L. REv. 653, 660 n.67 (1988) (noting that "one commentator suggests
that the Court should give the rational basis test 'teeth' " by requiring a real rather than
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In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,4" the city had
denied a permit for a group home for mentally retarded individuals under a zoning regulation that required a special use permit
for the construction of "hospitals for the insane or feebleminded."42 The Court held that application of the regulation to
the group home violated the Equal Protection Clause.4 3 However, the Court found that mental retardation was neither a suspect class requiring the application of strict scrutiny, nor a quasisuspect class requiring the application of intermediate scrutiny.44 According, the rational basis standard applied.4 5
The Court then broke from its typically deferential review
under the rational basis standard. Despite acknowledging that,
under this test, "legislation is presumed to be valid" and "the
Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude," the
Court nonetheless undertook an independent review to hold
that the zoning regulation was not rationally related to any legitimate end.46 The City of Cleburne argued that a number of traditionally legitimate interests, such as safety and traffic control,
were advanced by the zoning regulations. 47 The Court rejected
this argument, noting that "other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely permitted." 48 Although, under traditional rational basis analysis, a regulation is not invalid on grounds that it
is underinclusive or merely because only partial steps are taken
toward a legitimate goal, the Court nonetheless found the statan imaginary basis for the legislation (citing G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrTioNAL LAw, 604-05
(1lth ed. 1985)); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779-80 (1987) (stating that "[m]any commentators
have suggested that [recent Supreme Court decisions] represent an effort by the Court
to put more 'teeth' in the rational basis test"); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 187 (1983) (stating that state courts may
adopt a "rational basis with teeth test" when dealing with equal protection and due
process issues).
41. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
42. Id. at 436-37.
43. Id. at 450.
44. Id. at 440-42.
45. Id. at 446. The Court stated that "[t]o withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id.
46. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
47. Id. at 448-50.
48. Id. at 448. "At least this record does not clarify how... the characteristics of
the intended occupants of the [group home] rationally justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the same site for different purposes." Id. at 450.
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ute unconstitutional under the rational basis standard of
review.4 9
As this discussion illustrates, equal protection analysis has
evolved significantly from its rational basis origins. Federal
equal protection analysis today could be considered four-tiered
in nature: rational basis, rational basis with teeth, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.
IV.

MINNESOTA EQUAL PROTECTION

Minnesota courts have undertaken a similar struggle to establish a workable analysis for the state equal protection clause. 5 °
To a great extent, Minnesota courts have addressed the problem
through adoption of the federal equal protection standards.5"
Where no fundamental rights or suspect classifications are implicated, Minnesota applies a rational basis test. 2 Where the gov49. Id. See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (reasoning that equal protection does not require "that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all"). But see Now~A & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 590. Nowak and
Rotunda state that "all of the Supreme Court's recent majority opinions are consistent
with the use of a true rationality test for the review of economic or social welfare legislation," apparently including Cleburne in this conclusion. Id. Specifically, they suggest:
The justices had no difficulty in invalidating the zoning regulation at issue
in Cleburne because the denial of a permit for the group of mentally retarded
persons to live together could not in any conceivable way promote any interest
other than the desire to exclude mentally retarded persons from the city. The
city zoning ordinance that authorized a denial of a "special use permit" for
mentally retarded persons to live together in a group home in this case would
have allowed an identical number of unrelated people to inhabit an identical
house or apartment building if those persons were not mentally retarded.
Id.
50. See Deborah K. McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The Lochner Monster
in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 709 (1984). McKnight examines Minnesota's independent approach to equal protection analysis and criticizes the court for
engaging in substantive review which "appears confused and result-oriented." Id. at
735.
51. In many cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court has discussed equal protection
challenges only under the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Meyers v. Roberts, 310 Minn.
358, 363, 246 N.W.2d 186, 189 (1976) (holding that a county auditor's refusal to certify
a nineteen-year-old as court commissioner did not violate federal equal protection);
Blue Earth County Welfare Dept. v. Cabellero, 302 Minn. 329, 346, 255 N.W.2d 373, 383
(1974) (holding a Federal Housing Act amendment as applied to county welfare department did not violate federal equal protection); Larson v. City of Minneapolis, 190
Minn. 138, 139, 251 N.W. 121, 121 (1933) (applying the Federal Equal Protection
Clause to a Minnesota state statute concerning milk pasteurization); State v. Wagener,
77 Minn. 483, 498, 80 N.W. 633, 636 (1899) (focusing on whether there was "an apparent and just reason" for the distinction between classifications).
52. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 194, 210 N.W.2d 221, 226 (1973).
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ernmental action either interferes with fundamental rights or
53
imposes suspect classifications, heightened scrutiny is applied.
On the other hand, decisions by the Minnesota Supreme
Court suggest that even the federal four-tiered analysis is insufficiently flexible to provide a truly sensitive balancing of individual
and governmental interests. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
therefore, occasionally has found it necessary to deviate in some
respects from the federal analysis. This deviation occurs in two
forms under the Minnesota Constitution: the court vacillates between two different rational basis standards and has expanded
the reach of the heightened scrutiny standard.
A.

Rational Basis Standard
1.

Two-Factor and Three-FactorAnalyses: State v. Russell

As illustrated by the recent cases of State v. RusselP4 and Skeen
v. State,5 5 the Minnesota Supreme Court has vacillated between
two analytical approaches to rational basis review under the Minnesota Constitution. The court often has applied a two-factor
analysis apparently identical to the federal rational basis analysis.5 6 In a number of other cases, however, it has applied a threefactor analysis."
53. See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 313 N.W.2d 381, 383-84 (Minn. 1981) (applying strict
scrutiny to hold that requiring patrolmen to resign before running for public office
violated equal protection because the policy was not the least restrictive means available
to accomplish the State's goal); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978) (reasoning that legislative enactments which directly infringe on the fundamental right to
vote are subject to strict scrutiny).
54. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
55. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
56. See, e.g., In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 770 n.2 (Minn. 1986) (noting
that standards applicable under Minnesota state protection analysis are the same as
those applicable under federal analysis); AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist,
338 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Minn. 1983) (applying a two-factor rational basis test "coextensive" with the federal standard to uphold a statute that required public employees to
make additional payments to a pension fund); State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347 n.23
(Minn. 1977) (stating that federal equal protection standards are "synonymous" with
standards applied under the Minnesota Constitution).
57. See, e.g., Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that a statute providing that only certain personal injury actions survived an
individual's death did not pass the three-factor test); Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d
580, 581 (Minn. 1981) (applying the three-factor test to strike down a statute prohibiting state-employed attorneys who represented workers' compensation petitioners from
serving as workers' compensation judges for two years); Wegan v. Village of Lexington,
309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981) (applying the three-factor analysis to the Dram Shop
Act to hold that procedural requirements that distinguished between 3.2 beer and
stronger liquor were unconstitutional); Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299
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The three-factor analysis is substantially less deferential than
the two-factor analysis. Although both analyses require that "the
purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately
attempt to achieve,"5 8 the three-factor analysis uses two additional factors that encourage independent judicial review of the
appropriateness of the classification. These factors require the
court to consider:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within
the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly
arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial,
thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the
classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of
the law; that is there must be an evident connection between
the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed
remedy. 5 9
N.W.2d 138, 142 (1980) (finding that a statute limiting the amount of farm loss a taxpayer may offset against non-farm income was constitutional because there was a genuine, relevant and reasonable basis for the classification).
The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently first applied the three-factor test in the
late 1970s. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1979) (establishing three primary elements necessary to determine the constitutionality of statutory
classifications). Prior to Miller Brewing, the court maintained that state and federal
equal protection analyses were substantially identical. See McKnight, supra note 50, at
723 (citing State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 1977)); see also C. Thomas Stores
Sales Sys. v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 514, 297 N.W. 9, 16 (1941)).
58. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (citing Wegan v. Village of
Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981)); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (applying this same standard to the federal
constitution).
59. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 (citing Wegan, 309 N.W.2d at 280). Both the United
States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have occasionally applied the
federal rational basis test in a manner similar to Minnesota's three-factor test. See, e.g.,
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957) (reasoning that "genuinely different" characteristics of businesses may justify treating them differently); Gulf, Colorado & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897) (reasoning that a classification must bear "a
just and proper relation to the attempted classification" and cannot be a "mere arbitrary selection"); Halverson v. Rolvaag, 143 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. 1966) ("Equal protection of the law requires that legislative classifications be founded upon some real and
substantial difference bearing a fair relationship to the legislation so that the law operates equally and uniformly on all persons similarly situated.").
Justice Marshall discussed the rational basis standard in a case involving subsistence
benefits paid to needy children:
[I]ndividuals should not be afforded different treatment by the State unless
there is a relevant distinctionbetween them and a "statutory discrimination must
be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in
which it is found." Consequently, the State may not ... supply benefits to
some individuals while denying them to others who are similarly situated.
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In State v. Russell, ° the Minnesota Supreme Court used the
three-factor analysis to hold that section 152.023, subdivision 2
of the Minnesota Statutes violated equal protection under the
Minnesota Constitution.6 1 Although the statute had a legitimate
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
60. 477 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1991). Although the Russell court found a determination of the applicability of the federal strict scrutiny standard unnecessary, it suggested
that the statute might not have passed muster under this test. Id. at 888 n.2. In Russell
there was little question that the statute had a disparate impact on African Americans.
However, the court noted that federal strict scrutiny was applicable only where the legislature enacted the statute "because of" rather than "in spite of" an anticipated racially
discriminatory effect. Id. While courts ordinarily refuse to intrude or inquire into the
legislative process, Russell reasoned that the correlation between race, the type of cocaine used, and the "gross disparity in resulting punishment cries out for closer scrutiny
of the challenged laws." Id. The court further reasoned that the disparate effect of the
law, coupled with statutory history, could create an inference of discriminatory intent
that would trigger strict scrutiny. Id. The Russell court declined to apply this standard,
however, because it found the statute was unconstitutional under Minnesota's rational
basis test. Id. Justice Yetka, concurring specially, agreed with the majority that "strict
scrutiny could be applied to this statute since there is enough evidence from which to
infer discriminatory purpose." Id. at 892. Justice Simonett also concurred specially.
Id. at 894-95. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
Justice Coyne dissented, asserting that the majority was engaging in "an activist
form of judicial review." Id. at 895. She argued that the court had previously adopted
the federal two-factor rational basis standard and the intent requirement in disparate
impact cases. Id. at 896 & 902 n.1. InJustice Coyne's view, the majority had replaced
the rational basis test "not with a stricter standard, but with no standard at all." Id. at
902. She believed the legislature could reasonably distinguish between crack and powder cocaine based on differences in their form and marketing, and that there was no
evidence of either discriminatory purpose or enforcement. Id. at 895, 897-901. Moreover, a federal statute equating 100 grams of powder to one gram of crack for the
purpose of sentencing had been upheld as not violating federal due process or equal
protection guarantees. Id. at 897.
61. Russell 477 N.W.2d at 888. The Legislature subsequently amended this statute
to provide equivalent penalties for crack and powder cocaine. See Act, 1992 MINN. LAws
359. The changes included:
The 1992 amendment in subd. 2, in cl. (1) deleted "base" following "cocaine",
in cl. (2) added "other than cocaine", deleted former cl. (3) which made it a
crime to unlawfully possess one or more mixtures containing a narcotic drug
with the intent to sell it, and redesignated former cls. (4) to (7) as cls. (3) to
(6) respectively.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.023 (Supp. 1993). Subdivision 2 now reads:
A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the third degree if: (1) the
person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a total weight of three
grams or more containing cocaine; (2) the person unlawfully possesses one or
more mixtures of a total weight of ten grams or more containing a narcotic
drug other than cocaine ....
MINN. STAT. § 152.023, subd. 2 (Supp. 1993).
The Russell court also suggested that the statute might constitute a due process
violation. "Because the statute creates an irrebuttable presumption of intent to sell
without affording the defendant an affirmative defense of lack of intent to sell, and on
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purpose of discouraging the activities of street level drug dealers,
the court nonetheless held the statutory classifications to be
inappropriate.62
To reach this conclusion, the court found there was no "genuine and substantial" distinction between those who fell inside
and those who fell outside of the classification.6" The State had
argued that it was valid to distinguish between crack and powder
cocaine because an individual possessing three grams of crack
cocaine is presumably a drug dealer.6 4 Moreover, crack cocaine
was depicted as more addictive, more dangerous, and more
likely to be associated with violence than powder cocaine. 65 The
court rejected these distinctions because they were based on insufficient, contradicted anecdotal evidence that could be ex66
plained by factors unrelated to the form of the cocaine.
Next, the court reasoned that the classification was not "genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law." 67 The court could
find no connection between the Legislature's desire to penalize
68
street level drug dealers and the crack/powder classification.
Exhibiting concern about the statute's overinclusiveness, the
court noted that there was insufficient evidence to determine
whether the statute punished personal users as well as dealers.6 9
The court also criticized the statute for its underinclusiveness because the statute did not impose equivalent punishment for possession of an amount of powder cocaine that could easily be
converted into three grams of crack.7"
Although the statute did not pass constitutional muster under
the Minnesota three-factor rational basis test, it likely would have
the basis of that presumption automatically metes out a harsher punishment, the means
chosen to affect its purposes are constitutionally suspect." Russel4 477 N.W.2d at 891.
The court later dismissed this statement as dicta and refused to apply the due process
reasoning to a later case that challenged the amended statute. See State v. Clausen, 493
N.W.2d 113, 118-19 (Minn. 1992). The court expressly held that the amended statute
did not violate the due process clauses of the Minnesota or United States Constitutions.
Id.
62. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891.
63. Id. at 889.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 890.
66. Id. One alternative explanation provided by the court was gang warfare and
other types of group behavior. Id.
67. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
68. Id. at 890.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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satisfied the federal two-factor test. Lawmakers could reasonably
believe that the three-grams-of-crack/ten-grams-of-powder classification would target street level dealers. 7 The court's decision
under the Minnesota Constitution, however, averted consideration of this issue. 7 2 As might be expected, the Minnesota
Supreme Court's less deferential three-factor test produced substantially different results than might be anticipated under the
highly deferential two-factor test. Accordingly, Russell illustrates
a simple principle-the standard that a court chooses to apply is
likely to determine the outcome of the case.
2.

Relationship of Two-Factor and Three-FactorAnalyses:
Competing Approaches or CoordinatingAlternatives?

The court acknowledged in Russell that it had "not been consistent in explaining whether the rational basis standard under
Minnesota law, although articulated differently, is identical to
the federal standard or if it represents a less deferential standard
under the Minnesota Constitution."7 3 At issue, then, is whether
71. Id. at 888. The State argued that:
[TIhe legislature has a permissible and legitimate interest in regulating the
possession and sale of crack cocaine and cocaine powder and that it was reasonable for lawmakers to believe that the three grams of crack-ten grams of
powder classification would regulate the possession of those drugs by the
'street level' dealers at whom the statute was primarily aimed.
Id.
72. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 n.2. Minnesota's attempt to distinguish between
crack and powder cocaine would likely be constitutional under the federal standard
because similar distinctions in federal statutes have been upheld. For example, 21
U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B), which establishes a "100 to I ratio" for punishment of crack, as
opposed to powder, cocaine offenses, has survived due process and equal protection
challenges under the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975,
978-79 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (B) did not violate due process); accord United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Moreover, federal courts have held that the federal sentencing guidelines, which
distinguish between the forms of cocaine, pass the rational basis standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that all circuit courts
have ruled that the distinction between cocaine base and powder in the federal sentencing scheme is constitutional under a rational basis standard).
The Eighth Circuit, in particular, has repeatedly rejected Russell-type attacks on
federal sentencing guidelines under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the federal sentencing
guidelines did not violate federal equal protection); United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d
1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting application of the Russell rationale and upholding
the federal sentencing guidelines). But see United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768
(E.D. Mo. 1994) (finding that identical punishment for possession minimums of 5000
grams of cocaine or 50 grams of crack cocaine violated equal protection).
73. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
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there is a single rational basis standard under Minnesota equal
protection with the two-factor and three-factor standards competing for the coveted position, or, alternatively, if the two analyses reflect a two-tiered rational basis standard with the
appropriate tier applied according to the circumstances.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court presumably is trying to
establish a single standard, the effect of the competition has
been to produce a two-tiered standard.
a.

One Standard, Two Interpretations

Although the court apparently would prefer the establishment, once and for all, of one rational basis standard, it has been
unable to definitively determine which of the two approaches
should occupy that position. In In re Estate of Turner,"' then
ChiefJustice Amdahl attempted to settle the issue by stating that
"the rational basis standard used in Minnesota equal protection
analysis is the same as the standard used in federal equal protection analysis."75 The Turner court noted that the differences in
wording between the two analyses "merely represent[s] different
ways of stating the same analysis."7 6 In Russell, however, Justice
Wahl, writing for the majority, stated that "[s] ince the early eighties, this court has, in equal protection cases, articulated a ra77
tional basis test that differs from the federal standard.
Russell thus suggested the possibility that the Minnesota
Supreme Court had finally settled on the three-factor analysis as
the Minnesota rational basis standard. Applying this analysis, the
court could engage in independent judicial review of all legislation, including general social and economic regulations. However, Justice Simonett, somewhat apprehensive of this extension
of equal protection analysis, warned that the three-factor rational basis analysis must be restrained lest courts substitute their
74. 391 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1986).
75. Id. at 770 n.2.
76. Id.
77. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888; see also Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d
273, 281 n.14 (Minn. 1981) (asserting that, even if classifications were constitutional
under federal equal protection analysis, they might still be defective under the Minnesota three-factor test). In applying the three-factor analysis, however, the Russell court
did not attempt to explain the relationship between the two-factor and three-factor
analyses. See Russell 477 N.W.2d at 888-91.
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judgment for that of the legislature.7 Simonett's apprehensions
were assuaged two years later in Skeen v. State.79 In Skeen, the
court applied the two-factor analysis to uphold Minnesota's
school funding system in the face of an equal protection
challenge. 0
b.

Two-tiered Standard

In the wake of Russell and Skeen, and at least for the foreseeable future, Minnesota equal protection will continue to provide
two separate rational basis analyses. Because different results
may be obtained depending on the analysis applied, the court's
basis for determining which of the two analyses is applied remains an essential issue.
One option before the court would incorporate both analytical standards into the approach which currently predominates
both federal and Minnesota equal protection analysis, the use of
multiple tiers of review. The court would apply the more deferential two-factor analysis when neither the classifications used
nor the individual interest burdened raise any suspicion regarding the legitimacy of the government's objectives. The more
stringent three-factor analysis would be reserved for situations
that raise such suspicion.
Justices Simonett and Tomljanovich appear to support this approach. In Russell, Justice Simonett suggested that the court apply the more intrusive scrutiny of the three-factor analysis where
racial groups suffer a disparate impact.8 1
I would hold that where a facially neutral criminal statute has,
in its general application, a substantial discriminatory racial
impact, this court may then apply its three-factor rational basis test, even though there is no showing that the legislature
intended this impact. It seems to me the critical importance
of racial equality in our multicultural
society warrants this
82
closely tailored modification.
78. Russel, 477 N.W.2d at 894 (Simonett,J., concurring). Justice Simonett was con-

cerned that more invasive scrutiny of the legislative purpose underlying regulations
would revive "the discredited doctrine of substantive due process." Id.
79. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
80. Id. at 316.
81. Russel4 477 N.W.2d at 894 (Simonett, J., concurring).
82. Id. (footnote omitted). The approach advocated by Justices Simonett and
TomIjanovich offers the advantage of familiarity because it is analytically similar to the
approach used in employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1981 & Supp. 1993), and under the Minne-
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Although the Russell majority did not expressly accept Justice
Simonett's invitation to limit the application of the three-factor
analysis, it did indicate that the disparate impact on African
Americans imposed by the crack/cocaine distinction was one of
the persuasive factors encouraging use of the less deferential
analysis. The Russell majority reasoned that "[i] t is particularly
appropriate that we apply our stricter standard of rational basis
review in a case such as this where the challenged classification
appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden on
the very class of persons whose history inspired the principles of
equal protection.""3 On the other hand, in earlier cases, the
court's selection of either the two- or three-factor test did not
correlate with the absence or presence of disparate impact on
certain racial groups.8 4
Two years after Russell in her dissenting opinion to Mitchell v.
Steffen, 85 Justice Tomljanovich articulated a three-part framework
for selecting the analytical standard in constitutional equal prosota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1992). Under Title VII, the plaintiff has
an initial burden of demonstrating that a particular employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected class. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the practice is related to the job and consistent with business necessity. See
1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1993)) (reinstating analysis used prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)). Minnesota courts apply the same analysis to claims
brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hunter, Keith,
Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623-24 (1988) (placing initial burden on plaintiff to
show disparate treatment then shifting burden to defendant to prove valid business
reason).
. If, as suggested by Justices Simonett and Tomljanovich, the three-factor rational
basis test is applied in disparate impact cases, the plaintiff would bear the initial burden
of showing that the governmental action had a disparate impact on racial groups. The
burden would then shift to the government to show that the distinctions between the
various classes were "genuine and substantial," and that there was an evident connection between the classification and the law's purpose. This burden of proof is similar to
the employer's job relatedness/business necessity burden required under the employment discrimination statutes. Finally, both analyses require a showing of legitimate reasons for the discriminatory action.
83. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
84. Earlier court decisions applying the stricter three-factor standard did not involve race-based classifications. See, e.g., Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273
(Minn. 1981) (distinguishing 3.2 beer from stronger liquor); Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. 1980) (classifying farm and non-farm income); Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1979) (distinguishing, for
taxation purposes, Minnesota beer brewers from brewers with production facilities
outside the state). In one case that did involve a race-based classification, the court
applied the more deferential two-factor test. See State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347-48
(Minn. 1977).
85. 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993).
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tection challenges.8 6 Whenever a fundamental right is implicated or if a suspect class is burdened, the court should apply
strict scrutiny.87 Next, if the legislation has a disparate impact or
burdens a semi-suspect class, the three-pronged Russell test
should be applied.88 Finally, for all remaining legislation, the
court should employ the more deferential two-pronged rational
basis test. 89 To date, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has failed to define the relationship between the two approaches
to rational basis analysis.
c.

Skeen v. State and Mitchell v. Steffen: Lost
Opportunities

The Minnesota Supreme Court had two opportunities since
Russell to determine the relationship between the two- and threefactor rational basis analyses. However, it failed to take advantage of either.
The first opportunity arose in Mitchell v. Steffen 9 in which welfare recipients challenged a Minnesota statute that required a
six-month residency as a condition for receipt of full general
assistance benefits.9 1 The welfare recipients asserted that the
provision violated their right to travel under the federal constitution and their right to equal protection under both the federal
and Minnesota constitutions.9 2 The appellate court held that
the provision violated equal protection under the Minnesota
Constitution because the statute failed to satisfy the three-factor
Russell test.9" The appellate court found that the challenged stat86. Id. at 210 (Tomljanovich,J. dissenting). The Mitchell majority, however, relied
on federal equal protection rather than applying the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at
203.
87. Id. at 210.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993).
91. The challenged statutes provided that general assistance applicants who have
resided in Minnesota less than six months would receive 60% of the benefits available
to other applicants. See MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (1992). If the applicants received benefits in their last state of residence, they would be eligible for the lesser of those benefits
or the maximum Minnesota benefits. Id.
92. Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 199.
93. Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) affd on other
grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993). The court of appeals determined that the Russell three-factor test "applies when analyzing any case under the equal protection clause
of the Minnesota Constitution," not only where the classification has a racially disparate
impact. Id. at 904 n.2; see also Backdahl v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 479 N.W.2d 89
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (applying the three-factor test to uphold a statute that distin-
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ute created two classes of residents that were indistinguishable
except for their length of residence. 94
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in Mitchell, it did so based on the
fundamental rights prong of the Federal Equal Protection
Clause. 5 In fact, the court specifically declined to consider the
statute under the Minnesota Constitution.9 6
In Skeen v. State,9 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court bypassed a
second opportunity to clarify the relationship between the twofactor and three-factor analyses. In Skeen, the plaintiffs were
school districts and parents who claimed that Minnesota's public
guished between offenders younger than 18 years old and adult offenders for penalty
purposes under Minnesota's implied consent law).
94. MitchelL 487 N.W.2d at 901. The court of appeals reasoned that the State had
not shown genuine and substantial distinctions separating those within the classification
from those excluded. Id. at 904. The court determined that "the state must provide
more than anecdotal support for creating a classification that adversely affects one
group over another, particularly when such support is contrary to studies prepared by a
state agency." Id. (citing State v. Russell 477 N.W.2d 886, 889-90 (1991)). Furthermore,
the legislature's anecdotal evidence that people were coming to Minnesota because of
the higher benefits available was contrary to at least two agency studies. Id.
The appellate court also held that the State had not produced sufficient evidence
that the level of public assistance influenced decisions to migrate to Minnesota. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence the legislation furthered the State's purpose. Id.
The court reasoned that the classification was inconsistent with both the purpose of
MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (1992) and Minnesota's general assistance statute. Mitchel4 487
N.W.2d at 904. While one purpose of the general assistance statute was to provide
subsistence-level funds, the grant level provided by § 256D.065 "is insufficient to provide even housing, let alone other basic necessities of life." Id. at 904-05.
Finally, the court held that the statute used illegitimate means to achieve its purpose because it was overbroad. Id. at 905. Specifically, the statute affected all new residents by reducing benefits rather than only those purposely moving to Minnesota for
the benefits. Id.
95. Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Minn. 1993). Because the statute
used a classification that burdened a fundamental right to migrate, the court applied
the federal strict scrutiny test. Id. The court found that the statute was not necessary to
achieve some compelling state purpose. Although the State argued that conserving its
funds was a legitimate interest, the court found that this was not sufficiently compelling
to justify the means chosen. Id. The classification was not sufficiently precise; although
only a small percentage of public assistance applicants move to the state to receive
higher benefits, all new applicants were burdened. Id. at 897.
96. Mitchel4 504 N.W.2d at 203. The court stated: "There is no need to consider
whether the 1991 amendment violates our state equal protection clause, and we do not
reach that issue." Id. This wasted opportunity was not lost on Justice Tomljanovich.
She noted in her dissenting opinion that the court's "case law on state equal protection
analysis has not always been characterized by doctrinal constancy, and this case seems
an appropriate occasion to review briefly and to clarify that analysis." Id. at 208
(Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
97. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
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school financing system violated equal protection under the
Minnesota Constitution.9" Without articulating its rationale, the
court chose the two-factor over the three-factor analysis.9 9 As
might be expected, the school financing system passed muster
under the two-factor standard.
Taken together, Russell and Skeen illustrate the Minnesota
Supreme Court's reluctance to make a clear determination of
the applicable rational basis analysis.
3.

Current Status of Rational Basis Standard

At this point, the court remains unwilling-or unable-to select either the two-factor or three-factor analysis as the governing
rational basis standard under Minnesota equal protection. This
lack of resolution has created, in effect, a two-tiered rational basis standard. Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has failed
to identify any basis for selecting between the two standards. Arguably, Minnesota courts will determine which standard to apply
on an ad hoc basis in light of each particular court's view of the
appropriate level of deference based on the totality of
circumstances.
B.

Heightened Scrutiny Analysis

Applying a standard similar to federal heightened scrutiny
analysis, Minnesota courts closely examine legislation that either
differentiates on the basis of suspect classifications or burdens
fundamental rights. Consequently, classifications and fundamental rights that receive heightened scrutiny under federal
98. Id. at 312. The Skeen plaintiffs included 52 "outer-ring" suburban school districts. Id. at 302. These suburbs were characterized by income and home values above
the state average, but a low property tax base. Among the defendants were 24 "innerring" suburban school districts that had high property tax bases. Over the last 14 years,
plaintiff school districts had experienced an increase in student population while defendant school districts had experienced a decline. Neither rural districts nor inner-city
districts joined the suit. Id. at 302. The plaintiffs claimed that Minnesota's system of
funding education violates the education clause and equal protection guarantees of the
Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 303, 312.
99. See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 316. The court described the analysis to be applied as
follows:
Under the rational basis test, legislative classifications will be upheld if they are
at least rationally related to a legitimate state interest. It must only be shown
(1) that there was a legitimate purpose for the challenged legislation, and (2)
that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged
classification would promote that purpose.
Id. (citations omitted).
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equal protection receive equivalent protection under Minnesota
equal protection analysis. 10 0
However, the Minnesota court has indicated a willingness to
diverge from federal heightened scrutiny analysis in significant
ways. First, it may be willing to apply heightened scrutiny even
where there has been no showing of a governmental intent to
discriminate against the suspect class. 01 By contrast, under federal analysis the party challenging the governmental action must
show that the government intentionally discriminated on the basis of the suspect classification before a court will apply heightened scrutiny to the use of suspect classifications.10 2 Minnesota
may also diverge from federal heightened scrutiny by recognizing additional classes as "suspect."1 3 Finally, Minnesota may recognize fundamental rights under the Minnesota Constitution
that are not4 deemed fundamental under the federal
10
constitution.
1.

Proof of Intent to DiscriminateAgainst Suspect Class

As previously noted, legislation that discriminates on the basis
of suspect classifications is not subject to heightened scrutiny
under federal equal protection analysis unless the party challenging the legislation can prove an intent to discriminate
100. See, e.g., Anderson v. Medtronic, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1986) (applying
federal equal protection standard to Minnesota equal protection analysis). "[S]ocial
and economic legislation which does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on
fundamental rights carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality." Id. at 517.
101. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (1991) ("It is particularly appropriate
that we apply our stricter standard of rational basis review in a case such as this where
the challenged classification appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden
on the very class of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal protection.").
102. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (upholding written test
that had disparate impact on African Americans); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 278-81 (1979) (upholding veterans' preference despite fact that State was
aware of disparate impact on women).
Proof of intentional discrimination may be made in one of three ways. First, the
regulation may be discriminatory on its face. Id. at 8. Second, the regulation may be
facially neutral, but discriminatory as applied by the state. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373 (1886). Third, the legislation may be neutral on its face and as applied,
but may have a disparate impact on the group that was intentional. See Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
103. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); see infranotes 169-74 and accompanying text (discussing wealth as a suspect class under the Minnesota Constitution).
104. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. See also, Michael K. Steenson,
Fundamental Rights in The "Gray" Aiea: The Right of Privacy Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 383, (1994).
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against members of the classification. t°5 In Russell, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated a willingness to abandon the federal intent requirement.10 6 The Russell court implied that
disparate impact alone mightjustify heightened scrutiny, stating:
"[T] he correlation between race and the use of cocaine base or
powder and the gross disparity in resulting punishment cries out
10 7
for closer scrutiny of the challenged laws."
The court was highly critical of the intent requirement, 0 s reasoning that the intent requirement "places a virtually insurmountable burden on the challenger, who has the least access to
the information necessary to establish a possible invidious purpose."10 9 The court further indicated that the requirement "defies the fundamental tenets of equal protection" because
minorities are injured notjust by intentional discrimination, but
also by governmental indifference to their interests or blindness
to the effects of prior official discrimination.' 1 0
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
106. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991).
107. Id. The court in Russell did not find it necessary to apply heightened scrutiny to
the case because it found that the statute violated equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution, even under the rational basis test. Id. The court indicated that the
statute would not have passed the strict scrutiny test under Minnesota law. Id. at 889.
The statute's discriminatory impact on African Americans was incontrovertible.
The statute provided that a person in possession of three or more grams of cocaine base
(crack) was guilty of a third degree offense. Id. at 887. The penalty for that offense was
up to 20 years in prison with a presumptive sentence of an executed 48-month imprisonment. Id. By comparison, a person possessing the same amount (i.e., less than ten
grams) of powder cocaine was guilty of a fifth degree offense. Id. The penalty for a
fifth degree offense was up to five years imprisonment with a presumptive sentence of a
stayed 12-month imprisonment and probation. Id. Because crack cocaine users were
predominantly African American and powder cocaine users were predominantly white,
a greater percentage of African Americans suffered the more severe consequences. Id.
108. The Russell court reiterated that it was not bound by federal court interpretation of the federal clause when interpreting the state equal protection clause. Id. at
889. Despite its misgivings about the intent requirement, however, the court addressed
the intent issue in applying the Minnesota law of strict scrutiny to the challenged statute. The court stated that:
[U]nder Article 1, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution, the statistics showing the effect of the statute in operation combined with relevant factors that
appear in the statute's history could be held to create an inference of invidious discrimination which would trigger the need for satisfaction of a compelling state interest not shown on the record before us.
Id. at 888 n.2.
109. Id.
110. Id. As the -court recognized, "[i]f a state may not club minorities with its fist,
surely it may not indifferently inflict the same wound with the back of its hand." Id.
(citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,§ 16-21, at 1518-19 (2d ed.
1988)). The court's criticisms of the intent requirement have been raised by numerous
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The Minnesota Supreme Court's criticism of the intent requirement aligns it with others who have rejected the traditional
intentional/unintentional dichotomy. Commentator Charles R.
Lawrence III has rejected this strict dichotomy which asserts that
results are either consciously sought or "random, fortuitous, and
uninfluenced by the decisionmakers' beliefs, desires, and
wishes.""' 1 Rather, racially discriminatory results frequently stem
from unconscious racism that is produced by "a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still
plays a dominant role." 11 2 The intent requirement ignores not
only the history of race relations, but also the irrationality of racism and the workings of the human mind."1
Lawrence has suggested a new "cultural meaning" test for judicial recognition of racial discrimination.' 14 Under this test, strict
scrutiny analysis is triggered if the governmental action has racial
significance for a given culture. The Lawrence test would take
into account unconscious racism that cannot be directly observed. 1 5 The analysis evaluates governmental action "to determine whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture
attaches racial significance." '1 6 If some racial significance exists,
the governmental action is presumed to have a racially motivated
intent because the governmental actors are "part of the culture
and presumably could not have acted without being influenced
by racial considerations, even if they are unaware of their racist
beliefs." 1 7 Thus, strict scrutiny analysis should be applied."' 8
Using his "cultural meaning test," Lawrence analyzed a
number of cases, both real and hypothetical, in which African
Americans were disproportionately burdened by a facially neucivil rights advocates and constitutional commentators. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987). Lawrence notes the two principal objections raised by critics of the
federal intent requirement. The first is that it is nearly impossible to prove the intent of
a governmental body where various parties and motives are involved. Id. at 319. While
this objection is more procedural, the second is more fundamental. "It argues that the
injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of the decisionmakers' motives." Id. Racial
discrimination causes injury regardless of whether it is intentional. Id. at 319-20.
111. Lawrence, supra note 110, at 322.
112. Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. at 324 (footnote omitted).
115. Id.
116. Lawrence, supra note 110, at 324.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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tral governmental action."' He easily disposed of cases where
the actions clearly had racial connotations, such as the construction of a wall between African American and white communities 2 ' and the racial segregation of public schools."' The clear
racial connotations of such actions would give rise to the presumption of intentional racial discrimination and the application of strict scrutiny. Lawrence also easily disposed of actions
that have a disparate impact on African Americans but lack a
racial meaning, such as increases in public transportation
fares. 2 2 In such cases, the presumption would be that the actions were not race-based, and the rational basis standard would
apply.
More difficult are cases where the cultural meaning of the governmental action, whether race-based or race-neutral, was ambiguous. Lawrence cited two examples: (1) denial of a rezoning
request that would have allowed the construction of racially-integrated townhouses in an area zoned for single family homes in a
predominantly white suburb, 2 and (2) police department tests
for verbal ability. 1 24 In these ambiguous situations, a careful examination of evidence illustrative of the "historical and contemporaneous" meaning of particular governmental actions is
necessary.12 5 Such evidence would include the historical use of
such actions, 12 6 the contemporaneous meaning of such actions
28
to our culture, 27 the reasonableness of any nonracial criteria,
29
and the particular context of the action.'
Under the "cultural meaning test," the statute struck down in
Russell probably would have been grouped among the "more difficult" cases. In Russel4 unlike in cases of housing segregation,
for example, "there is less agreement about the social meaning"
119. Id. at 362-78.
120. Id. at 357-58, 363-64 (discussing City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100
(1981)).
121. Lawrence, supra note 110, at 362-63 (discussing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954)).
122.

Id. at 364-65.

123. Id. at 366-69 (discussing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
124. Id. at 369-76 (discussing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
125. Id. at 366.
126. Lawrence, supra note 110, at 366.
127. Id. at 367.
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id. at 369.
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of the racial impact of criminal sanctions.13 0 Nevertheless, there
is clear evidence to show that the statute's disparate impact on
African Americans conveys a cultural meaning with strong racial
connotations.
First, law enforcement has been used in a racially discriminatory fashion, both historically and presently."' Historically, law
enforcement was an important mechanism for maintaining the
social/political dominance of the majority culture.1 3 2 Unfortunately, one need look no further than the front pages of newspapers to conclude that3 discriminatory law enforcement is not
13
confined to the past.

Second, crime control conveys a racial meaning. In a recent
federal election, some candidates were criticized for making ref130. Id. at 365.
131. Lawrence, supra note 110, at 366. The Russell court used both statistical and
historical evidence of discrimination in a similar manner when it noted that "the statistics showing the effect of the statute in operation combined with relevant factors that
appear in the statute's history could be held to create an inference of invidious discrimination." State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (1991).
132. See CoRAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 115-16
(1993).
133. See, e.g., Defense Says Rodney King Invited Beating By Officers, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.),
Jan. 21, 1993, at 20A; No Blacks on jury in Rodney King Beating,STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Mar. 3,
1992, at 7A; Dave Shiflett, Rodney King Film May Find Place in the Mind's Gallery, STAR
TRIB. (Mpls.), May 8, 1992, at 19A. See also MANN, supra note 132, at 220-21 (discussing
studies which indicate that race discrimination plays a role in sentencing).
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System: Final Report (1993), "more than 75% of the judges, attorneys, and probation officers responded that bias against people of color exists in the court system.
Nearly 90% said the bias is subtle and hard to detect." MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT,

TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THEJUDICIAL SYsTEM: FINAL REPORT 50 (1993) (footnotes
omitted). The Task Force also compared imprisonment rates and departures from the
state's sentencing guidelines. Id. at 51-55. The report found thatjudges departed from
the sentencing guidelines to stay sentences more often for white offenders than for
minority offenders. Id. at 52. Likewise, judges departed from the guidelines more
often to imprison minorities than whites. Id. Although the rate of departure was not
statistically significant, the Task Force observed "certain patterns" that showed that
"people of color had consistently higher imprisonment rates" compared to whites. Id.
at 52-53, 55. The result was the same regardless of whether the study controlled for
criminal history. Id. at 51-53. Additionally, the Task Force found that even where other
factors were equal (i.e. criminal history score, severity of offense level, gender, employment status, age or method of conviction), African American offenders were still more
likely to do jail time than white offenders. Id. at 56. In Hennepin County misdemeanor
cases, "whites were more likely to receive a fine when compared to people of color, and
people of color were more likely than whites to have a jail sentence imposed even
though they were convicted of the same offense and had similar criminal histories." Id.
at 56.
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erences to issues of crime which
were merely thinly veiled state134
ments with racial connotations.
Third, the nonracial criteria that supported the disparate
criminal sanctions for possession of crack
cocaine, as opposed to
135
powder cocaine, were not reasonable.
Fourth, the particular context of the crack cocaine provision
demonstrates a racial connotation. Although the State in Russell
advanced a number of justifications to support its contention
that there was a "substantial and genuine distinction" between
crack and powder cocaine, those justifications have, by themselves, traditionally evoked racial connotations.1 36 The State argued that a smaller amount of crack cocaine was indicative of
the defendant's involvement in drug dealing, as opposed to
134. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992). Hacker illustrated the political use of the crime/race connection by
reference to George Bush's first presidential campaign. Hacker recounted that:
Two Black Americans played critical roles in George Bush's 1988 presidential victory. One was Jesse Jackson, who became a major contender for the
Democratic nomination. The other was a man named Willie Horton, a convicted murderer from the state of Massachusetts.
... Willie Horton was made part of the campaign by Republican strategists,
who cited him as a casebook study of what is wrong with the criminal justice
system. Even though he had been sentenced to a lengthy term for murder,
Horton still qualified for a furlough program, which allowed him to leave the
prison for specified periods. During one such sojourn, he took off for Maryland, where he broke into a home of a white couple, and then proceeded to
tie up the man and brutally rape the woman.
All this happened while Michael Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic candidate,
was serving as governor of Massachusetts. Of course, Dukakis had not been
directly aware of Horton's eligibility for a furlough. Even so, those managing
the Bush campaign took care to have Willie Horton mentioned in speeches
and advertisements. They knew that few voters supported furloughs, and that
most would be aghast to learn they were awarded to murderers. That one
ended with a rape was not only reprehensible; some might add it was quite
predictable. It would be hard to find a better case for portraying a politician
as soft on crime and solicitous toward criminals.
But there was also the racial aspect. Willie Horton was black; his Maryland
victims were white. That racial nexus would have roused emotions had he
simply got hold of a gun and robbed a liquor store. However, Horton used his
grant of freedom to rape a white woman. Of all the offenses black men may
commit, a sexual assault on a white victim stirs deeply primal fears.
Id. at 179-80. See also id. at 202 ("[R]acial references tend to be conveyed in nuances
and codes, including allusions to crime and comments on quotas.").
David Duke also used the crime/race strategy as a campaign ploy. Said Duke, "You
might think my [conceivable] election is the worst fear of the Times-Picayune's editors
[but it's not. Their worst fear is having a flat tire near their inner-city office." Howard
Kurtz, New Orleans PaperPlays CentralRole in Contest, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1991, at A12.
135. See infta notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
136. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Minn. 1991).
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mere personal use,1 37 "that crack is more addictive and dangerous than powder cocaine,"13s and "that there is more violence
associated with the use of crack powder."" 9 Drug dealing, drug
addiction, danger, and violence are often used to stereotype African Americans.14 The cycle is perpetuated because the impact

of the crack/powder distinction-the incarceration
of African
14
Americans-creates additional racial stigma. '
Lawrence also pointed out the need to "pay heed to one's intuitions."1 2 "One individual's gut feeling is hardly conclusive evidence of cultural meaning, but such feelings often derive from
feelings that are more widely shared, and they may well indicate
137. Id. at 889.
138. Id. at 890.

139. Id.
140. See, e.g., HACKER, supra note 134, at 181 (noting that the general population
associates the phrase "black crime" with offenses that involve violence like murder, rob-

bery, and rape); id. at 187 (suggesting that the fear of black crime by whites is greater
than the actual probability of black crime); MANN,supra note 132, at 103, 144-45 (stating that the majority population associates African Americans with violent crime); id. at
208 (stating that "where the victim is white and the jurors are also white, and the defendant is a minority with whom a juror cannot identify, the horror of the murder is
intensified"); see also Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors:Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecutionof Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 ButT.L. REv.737, 764-65 (1991) (stat-

ing that "[m ] any whites still believe stereotypes such as the alleged desire of Blacks... to
be on welfare, their inability to be caring parents, and their angry or hostile nature" and
"that minorities are lazy and would rather steal than work"); A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr.,
Racism in Ameican and South Affican Courts: Similaritiesand Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L.

REv.

479, 533 (1990) (noting the "stereotype of blacks as less controlled, and so more violent
or more prone to crime than whites"); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage, Idealogy
and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 63 (Winter 1993) (discussing
how the acquittals in the first Rodney King trial demonstrated the power of the "Black
Savage" stereotype over juries).
141. See Lawrence, supra note 110, at 370-73. In a discussion of written examinations, Lawrence stated that:
Our society has increasingly sought to measure intelligence through the use of
written tests, and we have come to believe that performance on such tests accurately reflects the whole of our intelligence. Thus, most people are likely to
think of those who performed poorly on "Test 21" not simply as lacking in
communication skills but as unintelligent. The average person is likely to see
the city's use of the test as an admirable and reasonable attempt to insure that
the city has smart police officers. If larger numbers of blacks than white fail
the test, this will be seen as proof that blacks are not smart enough for the job.
Id. at 373.
Similarly, the average person is likely to view the statute challenged in Russell as an
admirable and reasonable attempt to keep the streets safe. See State v. Russell, 477
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991). The average person may consequently stigmatize African
Americans as being more prone to engaging in illegal activities when disproportionately
larger numbers of African Americans as compared to whites are incarcerated under the
statute.
142. Lawrence, supra note 110, at 370.
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that more substantial testimony is available."' 4 This may describe the Russell court's reaction to the cocaine provision, when
it observed that the disproportionate impact of the statute on
144
African Americans itself was evidence of racism.
To paraphrase Lawrence, in order to obtain strict scrutiny of
the statute under the cultural meaning test, the Russell
defendants:
[W]ould seek to convince the court that most people in our
culture believe that the average white person is [less likely to
be a cocaine dealer] than the average black person and that
whites will interpret the racially selective impact of [section
152.023, subd. 2(1)] as a confirmation of that belief. If the
culture gives the governmental action this kind of racial
meaning, the action constitutes a direct racial stigmatization.
Like the segregated beach and the Memphis wall, it conveys a
message that has its origins in a pervasive and mutually reinforcing pattern of racially stigmatizing actions, and it adds
one more stigmatizing action to that pattern. Presumably,
the decisionmakers who chose to [enact section 152.023,
subd. (1)] were aware of that message and14were
influenced by
5
unconsciously.
or
consciously
whether
it,
The Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from "governmental decisions that take race into account without good
and important reasons. Therefore, equal protection doctrine
must find a way to come to grips with unconscious racism."146
Unlike the intent test, the "cultural meaning test" attacks unconscious racism where governmental action has some racial
147
significance.
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Russell was justified in its criticism of the intent requirement. Government action that has a disparate racial impact should be subjected to
strict scrutiny, even absent proof of a conscious intent to discriminate, where the disparate impact has a cultural meaning that
143. Id.
144. See RusselJ 477 N.W.2d at 888 n.2; supra note 107 and accompanying text; see
also Feeney v. Massachusetts, 442 U.S. 256, 279-80 (1979) (finding that while the disparate impact on women of Massachusetts veterans' preference statute did not prove the
existence of a discriminatory purpose, it was relevant to prove purpose); Lawrence,
supra note 110, at 369-76 (discussing the effect of scores on a written civil service
examination).
145. See Lawrence, supra note 110, at 375.
146. Id. at 323.
147. Id. at 323-24.
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stigmatizes on the basis of race. In this way, perhaps equal protection analysis will come to grips with unconscious racism.14 8
2.

Additional Suspect Classificationsand FundamentalRights

The Warren Court's formulation of the strict scrutiny standard
created hope among some, and fear among others, that a plethora of interests would be deemed "fundamental" and hence receive the substantial protection of the strict scrutiny standard. 4 9
The Burger Court, by refusing to extend the coveted status to
housing or welfare benefits, quickly demonstrated that these
1 50
hopes and fears were unwarranted.
The Minnesota Constitution may be used as an alternative
means to extend fundamental right status to additional individual interests. The Minnesota Supreme Court has affirmed that
the state constitution can provide more protection to fundamental constitutional rights than the federal constitution offers.15 1
Furthermore, the court has recognized that additional fundamental rights may be either explicitly or implicitly found in the
152
state constitution.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,153 the
Texas system of financing public education was challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the students in poorer school districts received
substantially less expensive educations than students in more affluent districts.1 5 4 The United States Supreme Court determined that wealth did not constitute a suspect class, 155 and that
education was not a fundamental right. 5 6 Accordingly, the
148. Id. Lawrence summarized this argument by noting that "[iut may often be appropriate for the legal system to disregard the influence of the unconscious on individual or collective behavior. But where the goal is the eradication of invidious racial
discrimination, the law must recognize racism's primary source." Id. at 323.
149. Gunther, supra note 23, at 8-10.
150. Id. at 12-13 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971)).
151. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) ("We have noted that Minnesota is not limited by the United States Supreme Court and can provide more protection under the state constitution than is afforded under the federal constitution.").
152. Id.
153. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id. at 33, 37-38.
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Court held that the Texas 15finance
system was constitutional
7
under the rational basis test.
By comparison, in a similar challenge to the constitutionality
of the Minnesota public school financing system, the Minnesota
Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to extend additional protection under the Minnesota Constitution. In the
denouement of the longest-running civil case in the history of
Minnesota, 158 the state supreme court affirmed that education is
of the equal protection
a fundamental right within the meaning
1 59
clause of the Minnesota Constitution.
Nevertheless, while conceding that the present system of funding public education in the state is not a perfect system,1 60 the
court declared that the statutory scheme did not violate either
the education clause1 61 or equal protection under the state constitution. 162 Even though the Skeen court determined that the
157. Id. at 55.
158. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d 299. The Sheen action was originally brought in Wright
County District Court in October, 1988. Id. at 301. After a 67-day trial, Judge GaryJ.
Meyer handed down his decision, finding the financing system unconstitutional. Both
parties appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals
and certified the case to the state supreme court. Id. at 302. See also Kathy Smith Ruhland, Equal Opportunity Educationfor Minnesota's School Children: A Missed Opportunity by
the Court, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. Rv. 559 (1994).
159. Sheen, 505 N.W.2d at 320. The court also found that education was a fundamental right under the state's education clause. Id. at 313. The education clause of the
Minnesota Constitution requires that the state "shall" provide a "general and uniform
system of public schools." See MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. The Sheen court found that
this education clause imposes an affirmative duty on the state. Sheen, 505 N.W.2d at
313. The education clause is the only place in the Minnesota Constitution where an
explicit obligation is imposed on the Legislature with the words "it is the duty of the
legislature." Id. The Sheen court also recognized the extensive social importance of
education. Id. at 313. The Skeen court concluded that the explicit language of the state
constitution and the social importance of education raised the caliber of the right to an
education to a fundamental right. Id.
160. Id. at 320.
161. Id. The education clause of the Minnesota Constitution states:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the
intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general
and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of
public schools throughout the state.
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.

162. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 320. The district court in Sheen held that the right to an
education is a fundamental right under the equal protection guarantee of the Minnesota Constitution. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order [and incorporated Memorandum], Sheen v. State, No. C7-88-1954 (Wright Co. Dist. Ct. December 17,
1991). The district court held that, although the right to an education is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, Minnesota is not bound by federal
law when interpreting the state constitution. Id. at 173-76. Fundamental rights are
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right to education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the state
constitution, it drew a fine distinction between the right itself
and the funding scheme that provides that right.1 63 The scope
of the fundamental right to an education under the Minnesota
Constitution would not stretch to cover the funding of the educational system in the view of the Skeen court. 164 However, any
funding scheme must be consistent throughout the state at a ba65
sic level.'
The Skeen court went on to hold that, although the fundamental right to an education would trigger strict scrutiny review of
any affiliated legislation, a lesser standard of review would apply
1 66
for analysis of legislation regarding the funding of education.
Because the court differentiated between the fundamental right
to an education and the funding of that right, the legislature's
educational funding scheme simply needed to pass the twopronged rational basis test.'6 7 The Skeen court then found that
the system of education financing readily passed this lenient twopronged analysis.16 8
defined as those expressed and implied by the constitution. Because the Minnesota
Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, explicitly and implicitly guarantees
the right to a uniform education, education constitutes a fundamental right under state
law. Id. at 178. In addition, the district court held that wealth classifications are suspect
under Minnesota law, particularly where they affect the right to an education. Id. at
183-84.
163. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 314-15 (Minn. 1993).
164. Id. In the original Minnesota Constitution of 1857, educational funding was
provided under a different section than the education clause itself. Compare MINN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1857) with supra note 161. The Sheen court found that this distinct
difference in the placement of the education clause and the education funding clause
indicated that the legislature distinguished between the right to education and the financing of an education. Sheen, 505 N.W.2d at 315. While the Minnesota Constitution
imposes a "duty" on the Legislature to establish a "general and uniform system of public
schools," the constitution requires only that the Legislature "shall make provisions" for
a "thorough and efficient system of public schools." Id. This difference in legislative
intent compelled the Sheen court to hold that different standards of review would apply
to statutes that burden these two different constitutional clauses. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. ("[A] lesser standard, such as a rational basis test, should apply to the determination of whether the financing of such a system is 'thorough and efficient.' ").
167. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 316 ("[W]e believe that challenges to the state's financing
of education beyond what is necessary to provide an adequate level of education which
meets all state standards must be evaluated, not under strict scrutiny, but rather under
the rational basis test.").
168. Id. The legislation provided a basic and uniform funding of education, that
guaranteed an acceptable level of education state-wide. In addition, the legislation allowed school districts to supplement that basic funding with contributions of their own
choosing. Id. This satisfied a legitimate state purpose in encouraging innovation by the
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Although the practical results from the state equal protection
1 69
analysis in Skeen and the federal analysis applied in Rodriguez'
were similar, Skeen still demonstrates the potential for significant
differences in analysis. The extension of fundamental right status to education shows that the Minnesota Supreme Court is
generally willing to use the state constitution to protect more
individual rights than those granted protection under the federal constitution.
Moreover, Skeen hints that the court may extend suspect class
status to additional groups in the future. The Skeen plaintiffs did
not sufficiently demonstrate that they were historically subject to
the "purposeful unequal treatment" that would relegate them to
a "position of political powerlessness."17 0 The court noted that
in those cases in which wealth was a suspect class,17 1 "the apparent disparities were far greater than the present case and the
plaintiffs were relatively powerless, thereby facilitating a 'suspect
class' finding." 7 2 In Skeen, however, there were no great disparities in revenues. The court thus reasoned that generally the disadvantaged class in school funding cases is "not susceptible to
being classified as a 'suspect class' absent any evidence that the
financing system7 3 discriminates against a definable category of
'poor' people."'
Furthermore, the financing system does not
result in the "absolute deprivation of education."174 Accordingly, the court might be willing to reconsider the question when
the facts of a case show greater disparities in wealth or political
power.
In summary, recent cases reflect the Minnesota Supreme
Court's discomfort with the inflexible boundaries of federal
heightened scrutiny analysis. To ensure greater flexibility, the
individual school districts to add to the basic state funding. The legislation also balanced the conflict between the desire of society to provide equal educational opportunities to all its citizens and the desire of all parents to provide the best education for
their own children. Id. (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 48-49 (1973)).
169. See supra notes 153-57, and accompanying text (discussing the Rodriguez
analysis).
170. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 314 (noting "the Minnesota Constitution does not require
strict economic equality under the equal protection clause").
171. Id. at 318 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367, cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)).
172. Id. at 314.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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court has considered eliminating the proof of intent required
under this standard. In addition, the court has interpreted the
state equal protection clause to protect additional individual interests as "fundamental rights," and has indicated that it may be
willing to grant "suspect class" status to additional groups.
V.

"NEw ARTICULATIONS"-MULTI-FACTOR SLIDING SCALE
APPROACH TO EQUAL PROTECTION

A.

Need for an Independent Minnesota Equal Protection Standard

In In re Estate of Turner,'7 5 Justice Wahl made a cogent argument for the adoption of an equal protection analysis that would
differ from and be independent of federal analysis under the
Constitution. Justice Wahl articulated two reasons why Minnesota should apply its own constitutional standard of rational basis
review.
The first reason is the difficulty courts experience discerning
the actual level of scrutiny that the federal rational basis standard represents. Justice Wahl suggested that while the language
of the United States Supreme Court suggests an extremely deferential standard of review, "the Court has, on occasion, invalidated legislation as irrational by analyses that depart from
deference and appear to constitute much more substantive levels
of review."' 7 6
The second reason is the need for stability in construing the
Minnesota Constitution. If the meaning of Minnesota's equal
protection guarantee shifts every time federal case law changes,
the "integrity and independence of our state constitution" will
be undermined.' 7 7 Unquestioning dependence on federal law
would "degrade the special role of this court, as the highest
court of a sovereign state, to respond to the needs of Minnesota
citizens." '78 A more substantial standard of review would provide a meaningful judicial inquiry that would protect against ar1 79
bitrary and unreasonable discrimination.
This period in the history of Minnesota's judicial system is particularly appropriate for a reconsideration of our equal protection jurisprudence. As Gunther points out, "rapid changes in
175.
176.
177.
178.

391 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1986).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 773.
Id.

179. Id. at 772-73.
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personnel, and in concomitant perception of values, [can] coexist with preservation of desirable institutional qualities of rea80
soned elaboration and candor" in some situations.1
Historically, two characteristics are necessary for a successful
change in constitutional adjudication. "[T] here [must be] available doctrinal tools with which new constitutional approaches
could be fashioned; and there [must be] Justices with the talent
to reexamine the old and develop the new carefully and imaginatively."1 8 The requisite doctrinal and personnel characteristics are present at this period in the development of Minnesota
equal protection. As recent cases show, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has shown both a readiness and the capacity to adopt an
independent equal protection standard.
Minnesota courts have available "doctrinal materials that can
be refashioned to reflect altered values. 1 2 As Justice Wahl has
noted, neither federal nor state equal protection analysis is
firmly established. This is particularly true of Minnesota equal
protection analysis. Reliance on the Minnesota Constitution as
the source of law, rather than the federal constitution, is a relatively new phenomenon.'
In addition, justices with the requisite talents to develop a new
standard are now seated on the Minnesota Supreme Court.1 4
This court has demonstrated its ample legal expertise and acumen, as well as its skill at critical and creative analysis. Additionally, the composition of the court, and of the state judiciary as a
whole, has begun to more closely reflect the diversity of society
in general. As more diverse points of view are represented on
both sides of the bench, the judicial system may find that traditional legal practices and doctrines cannot sufficiently accommo8 5
date the reasonable interests of all groups.1
180. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 5.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 7.
183. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); Shirley
Abrahamson, Reincarnation& Reawakening, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. IND. RTS. AND RESp. 26 ("In
judicial jargon, new federalism describes a growing awareness in the state courts of the
importance of state law, especially state constitutional law, as the basis for the protection of individual rights against state government.").
184. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 7.
185. For example, recent studies of the Minnesota legal system disclosed failings
with regard to gender and race issues. See, e.g., HENNEPIN COUNTY BAR AssOCIATION
GLAss CEILING TASK FORCE REPORT 1 (1993) ("There is growing evidence and a developing consensus that women lawyers' and lawyers' of color failure as a group to advance
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Thus, the need for an independent state standard for equal
protection and' a unique opportunity to develop that standard
have propitiously converged in Minnesota. Important questions,
however, regarding the type of standard to be developed remain
unanswered. The following section proposes an approach to
equal protection analysis under the Minnesota Constitution.
B.

Proposal: A Multi-Factor Sliding-Scale Approach

Gunther identified a number of attempts by both the United
States Supreme Court and individual justices to formulate "an
overarching inquiry applicable to 'all' equal protection cases."" 6
For example, the Court has applied variations of the ends/
means analysis in its current multi-tiered approach."8 7
Minnesota's multi-tiered approach to equal protection analysis
under the state constitution has proven similarly unsatisfactory.
The lack of flexibility has provided insufficient protection to important interests. Moreover, the multi-tiered structure has arwithin legal organizations has little to do with their abilities and much to do with the
organizations themselves."); MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS: FINAL REPORT

3-4 (1989) (noting that "perceptions of women and

men as to the treatment of women in the judicial system, the courtroom, and the legal
profession" vary significantly, and that "concrete and difficult" gender bias "must be
addressed in order to insure fairness"); TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS, supra note 133, at S2 (recognizing "the need to hire more people of color throughout our court system and
to ensure that those we hire, whatever color, are culturally sensitive to all the people we
serve; the need to begin systematically keeping race-specific records; [and] the need for
more and better training in cultural awareness/cultural diversity").
186. Gunther, supra note 23, at 17; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had
difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be applied
consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications.").
187. The Court has queried whether there is "an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered by the differential treatment." Gunther, supra note 23, at 17 (quoting Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (opinion by Marshall,J.)). Gunther suggests that in the 1971 Term, the Court "found bite in the equal protection
clause after explicitly voicing the traditional toothless minimal scrutiny standard." Id. at
18-19. The author determined that the Court had shifted its focus from an extremely
deferential ends/means review to an independent review of the means chosen. The
Court, in effect, asked whether the means had a "substantial relationship" to the legislative ends. Id. at 18-20.
The Court apparently has failed to act in accordance with Gunther's predictions.
Since the 1971 term, the Court has continued to focus on the legitimacy of the legislative ends. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985)
(holding a housing ordinance unconstitutional where legislative ends were not justifiable and the statute reflected "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded"); see
also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (striking a gender-biased statute for reasons similar to those stated in C/eburne).
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guably encouraged a result-oriented approach to choosing the
appropriate level of scrutiny.' 8 8 The multi-tiered approach requires the application of one of at least four different standards,
each with a different degree of deference to legislative decisions." 9 The degree of deference paid to the legislature generally determines the outcome, that is, whether or not the
enactment will be found constitutional.19 0
Justice Marshall suggested a clean break with the multi-tiered
formula. In his dissent in Dandridgev. Williams, 9 ' he formulated
what Gunther describes as a "multifactor, sliding-scale analysis."1 2 Instead of adhering to a mechanical determination of
whether or not a fundamental right exists, Marshall exhorted
the Court to consider the "facts and circumstances" of each case,
188. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (stating that "levels of
scrutiny . . . may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result");
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the
two-tier approach has been criticized as "a result-oriented substitute for more critical
analysis"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("We are told no more than that this case falls in 'the area of economics and social
welfare,' with the implication that from there the answer is obvious."); see generally Gunther, supra note 23, at 36 (indicating that "[a]fter one takes account of all the deviant
applications and contextual explanations, there remains the undeniable residue that
old equal protection formulations have been given an interventionist twist in a significant number of cases, with widespread support on the Court.").
189. These four standards are: two-factor rational basis, three-factor rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. See supra parts IV.A.-B. The court conceivably
could also adopt the federal rational basis with teeth standard. See supra part III.C.
Whatever state standards Minnesota applies, they are, of course, separate from the federal standards. Thus, parties involved in equal protection cases in Minnesota consequently are presented with a bewildering array of standards because the federal strict
scrutiny standard differs in important respects from the Minnesota strict scrutiny
standard.
190. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 8; see also supra part IV.A.1 (suggesting that the
result in Russell would likely have been different had the two-factor rational basis standard been applied).
191. 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Dandridge, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law that set a ceiling for the level
of benefits a family could receive under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program. Id. at 487. Because the program involved "economics and social welfare," the
Court applied a rational basis test. Id. at 485. Justice Marshall charged that the majority's decision had "emasculated the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional principle applicable to the area of social welfare administration." Id. at 508. He asserted that
the strict two-tier approach "lays down an insupportable test for determining whether a
State has denied its citizens the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 518. Justice Marshall attacked the traditional approach to Equal Protection analysis as judicial pigeonholing, citing the fatal flaw in such reasoning: "This case simply defies easy
characterization in terms of one or the other of [the rational basis and strict scrutiny]
'tests.' " Id. at 520.
192. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 17-18.
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concentrating on "the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive,
and the asserted state interests in support of the classification."'
This single standard could be applied to all cases.
For these reasons, the multi-factor sliding-scale approach is superior to the multi-tiered approach. Despite being a truism, the
legal standard, when applied to the particular facts, should determine the outcome. The reality of current equal protection analysis under both the federal and Minnesota constitutions is often
in conflict with this truism. The renewed vigor of the Minnesota
Constitution offers our state courts an opportunity to take a
more principled approach to equal protection and to establish a
standard applicable to all equal protection cases.
C. Assessment of the Sliding-Scale Analysis
Gunther suggests several important questions that courts
should consider when considering adoption of a new analytical
framework. The reality of the model must be the first consideration: To what extent do prior decisions conform to the new
model? Is there reason to believe the old model is inadequate?
The second consideration is the attractiveness of the model: Are
there indications in court decisions that the model would be
adopted? What features of the model make it attractive for the
court to adopt? Finally, the court must consider potential
problems the proposed model would create: To what extent
must the details of the model be fleshed out and refined to make
19 4
it "an operational judicial technique for the years to come?"
Application of these questions to the multi-factor sliding-scale
approach indicates that this approach has great promise.
193. Dandridge,397 U.S. at 521; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 343-44 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that financially destitute women comprise a class
that is subjected to "a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 nn.1-2 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (determining the degree to which a classification is objectionable by considering if the characteristic was
immutable, if the burdened class comprised victims of historic, pervasive discrimination, and whether the classification was totally irrational).
194. Gunther, supra note 23, at 24-25. Although Gunther's framework refers to a
specific change in the United States Supreme Court analysis, the questions he raises are
arguably relevant to the pronouncement of any new analytical framework.
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1. Reality of Approach
While there has been no "conscious" adherence to the slidingscale analysis, both the United States and Minnesota Supreme
Courts have nonetheless relied on this approach.
"This is essentially what the United States Supreme Court has
done in applying equal protection concepts in numerous cases,
though the various aspects of the approach appear with a greater
or lesser degree of clarity in particular cases."195 For example, in
Craig v. Boren,'9 6 Justice Stevens expressed his opinion that only
one standard was, in fact, applied in equal protection analysis.
The Court's so-called "two-tiered analysis of equal protection
claims ... is a method the court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." 9 7 In order to identify this single standard, one
must look to the "careful explanation of the reasons motivating
particular decisions" rather than at any "attempt to articulate it
in all-encompassing terms."198
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court's application of a multi-factor approach was more evident.' 99 In that case, the Court based its
decision on the importance of the individual interests involved,200 the importance of the state interests,2"' and the identity of the individuals burdened, 0 2 to justify its departure from
its traditional equal protection formulations.20 3 Plyler involved a
Texas statute which authorized school districts to deny admission to the children of illegal aliens and withhold state funds for
their education.20 4
195. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521-22 n.15 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
196. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (StevensJ., concurring).
197. Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
198. Id.
199. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
200. Id. at 218-23.
201. Id. at 227-30.
202. Id. at 210-16.
203. Id. at 230. Plyler could be regarded as another example of the Court's application of rational basis with teeth. See suprapart III.C. "But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, the State must demonstrate that the
classification is reasonably adapted to 'the purposes for which the state desires to use
it.'" Plyler, 457 U.S. at 203, 226 (emphasis omitted) (citing Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 664-65 (1948)). Arguably, the Plyler Court used the rational basis standard
but, shifted the burden to the state to prove presence of a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.
204. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
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Under normal circumstances, the Court would have applied
the rational basis standard to the statute. °5 Here, however, the
Court observed that "more is involved in these cases than the
abstract question whether [section] 21.031 discriminates against
20 6
a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right."
In determining the rationality of [section] 21.031, we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to
the innocent children who are its victims. In light of these
countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in [section]
21.031 can hardly be considered 20rational
unless it furthers
7

some substantial goal of the

State.

Some of the newest members of the Court appear to have
joined the ranks of justices who are dissatisfied with the inflexibility of multi-tiered equal protection analysis. In Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey,2°' ajoint opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter signaled a move from the rigid, formalistic approach to a more relativistic determination of whether the
challenged legislation worked an "undue burden" on a fundamental right.20 9 The joint opinion rejected the strict scrutiny
analysis as paying too little attention to important state interests. 210 Instead of following the rigid framework imposed by the
tiers of scrutiny, the Casey opinion balanced the strength of the
individual's interests, the strength of the state's interests, and the
extent of the burden that the state regulation placed on the indi2 11
vidual interest.
205. Id. at 216-18.
206. Id. at 223.
207. Id. at 223-24. The Court ultimately reverted to the rational basis standard traditionally applied to education and wealth cases and refused to extend Plyler beyond its
"unique circumstances." Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs. 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988).

The Plyler result nonetheless supports, rather than contradicts, the notion that achieving equal protection of the law requires the balancing of interests of each case, rather
than abstract formulations.
208. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
209. Id. at 2820.

210. Id. at 2801.
211. See id. at 2805-08. Although Casey was brought under the Due Process Clause
rather than the Equal Protection Clause, these two guarantees are analyzed in a substantially similar fashion. See, e.g., Russell Pannier, Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Arguments: An Analysis of the Tussman and Tenbroek Distinction, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 535 (1989) (discussing distinctions between equal protection and due process
analyses). Moreover, both protections originate from the same amendment. See gener-

ally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, it is not unusual that a claim brought under
the Due Process Clause may be actionable on equal protection grounds as well. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (noting that the
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment is
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has essentially applied a multifactor approach in numerous cases. In Skeen v. State, 2 for example, despite its rejection of wealth as a suspect classification and
its refusal to extend fundamental right status to the financing of
education, the court nonetheless implied that the extent of financial disparities and extent of the adequacy of education were important considerations.2 1 ' The court distinguished other cases
that held school finance systems unconstitutional by arguing
that the disparities in financial means in the school districts
under consideration were not as substantial. 214 Moreover, the
court relied heavily on the fact that all students were receiving
an adequate education, implying that any adverse affect on the
students resulting from a lack of funds would have been a relevant consideration.
Consequently, one can successfully argue that both the federal
and state supreme courts base their initial determination of
which standard is to apply according to the same balancing of
factors.
2. Attractiveness of Approach
Several observations suggest that the multi-factor sliding-scale
analysis would be attractive to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court has shown a basic dissatisfaction with the multi-tiered approach, or, at the very least, the
adequacy of the various tiers.21 5
Second, the multi-factor sliding-scale approach offers a
number of practical advantages. Adoption would signal a clean
break with the current multi-tiered approach. The current
method, which merely presents variations of the old end/means
analysis, threatens the imposition of additional tiers to an alsimilar to principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment) with
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543
n.23 (1987) (recognizing that entities subject to suit under Due Process Clause of Fifth
Amendment may also be subject to suit under the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment) and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1983) (equating
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause to analysis under the Due Process Clause).
212. 505 N.W.2d 299 (1993).
213. Id. at 314-15.
214. Id. at 317-18.
215. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 772-73
concurring).
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ready confusing analytical framework.2 1 6 A clean break would
have the added benefit of promoting the independent development of state equal protection law.2 17 Accordingly, adoption of
the multi-factor approach would limit federal court review of
state court decisions by presenting clear evidence of adequate
and independent state grounds for decisions.
Next, the multi-factor sliding-scale approach makes sense as a
matter of judicial policy. Instead of following "a relentlessly formalistic catechism,"21 this more flexible approach balances the
actual effect legislation has on the lives of real people against the
interests of the state. 2 1 9 Given the varied nature of individual
and governmental interests, the number of potential combinations would make it impractical to sort interests into rigid categories. Moreover, the relative strengths of those interests, and the
extent to which those interests would be affected would also vary
enormously.
Perhaps most important, adoption of the multi-factor sliding
scale approach may embody most closely the true basis of courts'
decisions. Federal and state courts arguably apply these factors,
overtly or covertly, to select the appropriate standard of review.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's current practice of shifting
without notice between the two-factor and three-factor rational
216. One example is the three-factor rational basis analysis under Minnesota equal
protection. See also Gunther, supra note 23, at 21. Gunther stated that the means-focused technique would be "more interventionist" than the old rational basis standard,
but "considerably less strict" than the strict scrutiny standard. He noted, however, that
this technique would not:
[M]ean the end of strict scrutiny. In the context of fundamental interests or
suspect classifications, the Court would continue to demand that the means be
more than reasonable-e.g., that they be 'necessary,' or the 'least restrictive'
ones.... The intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close the wide gap
between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level of the
minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.
Id. at 24.
217. The importance of independent state constitutional law is reflected in a detailed exploration of the topic by former Supreme CourtJustice Brennan. SeeWilliamJ.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 l-Lv. L. REv.

489 (1977).
218. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 341 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 344 (criticizing use of two-tiered standard and stating "a showing that
state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be
relevant for purposes of equal protection analysis"); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832-33 (1992) (holding that the effect of the spousal fiotification requirement on access to abortion by victims of spousal abuse constitutes an undue
burden).
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basis analyses, for example, threatens to undermine the court's
legitimacy.
3. Problems with Approach
Perhaps the most serious problem with the sliding-scale analysis is the potential for unbridled judicial interference with legislative enactments. 2 This accusation is valid only if one assumes
that the current multi-tiered approach is basically principled,
and that the personal predispositions of the members of the
court do not influence either the selection of the applicable
standard or the intensity with which the court applies the chosen
standard.
Another problem is the potential for increased litigation because of unsettled law and the possibility of additional protections. This rationale, taken to its logical extreme, however,
would support the withdrawal of constitutional protection from
even established fundamental rights and suspect classes. Additionally, the adoption of standards weighing the relative importance of interests and the burden upon those interests could well
encourage the legislature to take these factors into account
when adopting regulations. No undue burden would be imposed by requiring the legislature to articulate important interests and to carefully consider alternative approaches before
substantially interfering with important individual interests.
Thus, thoughtful legislation could mitigate the threat of increased litigation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As Justice Wahl incisively noted, it is time to end the "battle of
footnotes" over the appropriate Minnesota equal protection rational basis standard.2 2 1 The most responsible method would be
220. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244-48, 253-54 (1982) (Burger, CJ.
dissenting).
221. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J., concurring). Justice Wahl is seeking a cease-fire:
I am concerned, however, that footnote 2 in the majority opinion perpetuates
confusion and continues a "battle of footnotes" as to whether the rational basis
standard under Minnesota law is identical to the federal rational basis standard. By footnote in a 1981 opinion, [Wegan], we indicated the rational basis
standard under the Minnesota constitution differed from the federal standard.
By footnote in 1982, in [Sundquist], we stated that the federal and Minnesota
state standards were "coextensive." By footnote in 1984, in [McGuire], we again
declared that the state and federal standards are different. In today's opinion
we shift our position with still another footnote. The result is that the legal

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994

45

WILLIAM
MITCHEL
REVIEW
William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 20,LAW
Iss. 2 [1994],
Art. 5

[Vol. 20

to accept the court's historical need to balance the strengths of
competing interests. One means to this end would be to acknowledge the existence of a two-tiered rational basis standard
and to articulate the specific interests that implicate each tier.
This method, while more consistent with the traditional multitiered approach established under both federal and Minnesota
equal protection jurisprudence, fails to address the underlying
inability of inflexible categories to respond to an infinite variety
of governmental and individual interests.
The better method would be to honestly acknowledge the
multi-factor balancing process that in fact influences the selection of the equal protection standard that will be applied. Using
this ad hoc approach would establish a single standard for the
convenience of the bench, bar, and parties, and would increase
the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal system.
Chief Justice Marshall, when he formulated the rational basis
standard for constitutionality of legislation, set in motion an ongoing quest for a bright line.2 22 Minnesota jurisprudence has
established, at last estimate, at least five "bright lines" with hints
of additional sub-standards. Now, 175 years later, the time has
come to acknowledge that the complexities of our society need
not be reflected in a labyrinthine jurisprudential system. Rather,
application of an ad hoc balancing standard would explicitly recognize the factors that, although not presently acknowledged,
nonetheless effectively are applied through the courts' choice of
standards. While the ad hoc approach arguably is not as "bright"
as the current multi-tiered approach, its more accurate reflection of the actual judicial process is ultimately more lucid. As
Justice Wahl wisely observed, "To insist on engaging in judicial
review in the real world rather than in never-never land is not to
impermissibly substitute our own values and policy judgments
for those of the legislature but to move toward realism and pro22 3
tection of constitutional rights, this court's proper function."
community is left not knowing which statement of the relationship between
the state and federal rational basis standards, if any, is to be given precedential
value.
Id. at 771 (citations omitted) (referring to McGuire v. C & L Restaurant, Inc., 346
N.W.2d 605, 613 n.10 (Minn. 1984); AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist, 338
N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983); and Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d
273, 281 n.14 (Minn. 1981)).
222. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
223. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 773 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J.,
concurring).
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